
Tuomas Nevanlinna
Photo
Sakari Majantie
|
From Surullinen tapiiri ja muita kirjoituksia
('The sad tapir and other writings' Tammi, 2002
In the near future
New year's resolutions are an underestimated phenomenon. Public pronouncement
of resolutions is typically accompanied by a self-ironic smile which
underlines their non-existent possibilities of realisation. But such
a barrenly gruff 'realism' is a rather flat way of passing over the
unconscious forces that lie behind the phenomenon.
For more of us than we can guess live with
the idea that very soon, or at least in just a few years, our lives
will experience a turnaround after which everything will be unbelievably
much better. Just as soon as... errm... my 170-euro stock market investment
begins to produce the earth-shattering sums I have imagined, I will
devote myself to my family (or get myself a new spouse), tidy my desk,
buy a new computer, move to a sheep farm (and/or the city or village
centre) and write a thriller (and/or a doctoral thesis) in which I
will use the plot (and/or revolutionary scientic invention) I have
long been mulling over and which has never been utilised anywhere
else. Even one of these events, the optimistic presentiment continues,
will probably be sufficient to start a chain reaction toward a great
change. After this complete life-change a period of unbroken domestic
happiness and peaceful work, interrupted only by the civilised buzz
of conversation from the local gourmet restaurant.
The new year is an excellent calendrical
pretext for the surfacing of this libidinally charged thought-tiger.
Not everyone is so optimistic: there are plenty of depressed people
in the world. But the thought process preceding the great turnaround
which I outlined above actually produces depression as its
inevitable reverse.
How else would it be possible for things
to be – according to all metaphysical social democratic measures
– better than before, and people nevertheless more anxious and
depressed than perhaps ever before?
One reason is that we live in a culture in
which, for the first time in world history, everyone has been promised
the right to earthly happiness.
Neoliberalism derives in part from this spiritual
basis, prepared by egalitarianism. Perhaps growing differences in
income are not, after all, a troublesome and inevitable side effect
of the new prosperity, but its unconscious goal? However rich
I might be, I will always have less than I have been 'promised' on
the scale of perfect happiness. And as one moves along it, the only
cheering element is the fact that someone else has less...
Six months before changing over to the euro, the thought of the new
currency meant nothing to me. I had already for some time counted
myself among the least passionate rank-and-file supporters of the
European federation. To my knowledge, there looms no better alternative
on the medium-term political agenda, unless the union project and
globalisation were to be cancelled entirely. The members of the movement
promoting this idea will undoubtedly have the best party, but I'm
too old.
I was all the more surprised at new year
2002. Why was I suddenly almost enthusiastic about the arrival of
the euro?
In some way it must be linked with the turnaround
fantasies sparked by the new year. Just as if the problems of my previous
life were in some way linked with the very fact that Finland had the
Finnmark as its currency.
The millennium was regarded with universal
scepticism, and indeed in practice it remained a pseudo-event. Why?
Because it was not linked with any clearly delineated and shared lost
object. The end of the world and Y2K were in that respect very
minor straws. Diana's funeral, on the other hand, functioned well
as a global event, because its main character was a lost object known
by everyone.
Now, however, it turned out that I made an
unconscious link between my former self and the lost object, i.e.
the Finnmark. I was practically certain that the perfect detective
story would be ready soon.
Perhaps even in a castle in Spain, close
to a picturesque restaurant where I can pay in my home currency.
The romantic and the pervert
I have never had a particularly close relationship
with nature. According to a definition I developed as a young man,
it is a place where you can't get a taxi. I have always lived in
the city. In my schooldays, it's true, I lived in Espoo (near Helsinki)
which is widely known as a non-city.
I recognised
myself in the scene in Thomas Mann's The Magic Mountain in
which the main character gets lost on a skiing trip and notices
what an unease-provoking place nature is. He realises that trees
are more terrifying than criminals or animals: you can always threaten
a villain that the police are on their way, and you can try to coax
even a wild beast, but if a tree is going to fall, it just falls.
You can't communicate with nature, it doesn't understand jokes or
philosophy. And what sense is there in that kind of existence! Surely
it cannot avoid being strange and threatening?
Urbanity is
not, however, a very convincing explanation for the lack of a wonderfully
intimate relationship with nature. One can, indeed, argue that it
is only urbanism that creates a relationship with nature as nature.
The aestheticisation of nature into landscape, for example, is the
invention of the urban intelligentsia. Local inhabitants have a
practical relationship with their environment: to them, it is their
back yard, the basis of their livelihood, a world of danger and
utility. The landscape – in the aestheticising sense of the
world – is the creation of the daft graduate who arrives in
the countryside for his holidays.
The idealisation
of nature as something original, untouched and beautiful (or sublime)
is called romanticism. The term is generally used in a disparaging
sense. And it is indeed easy to demonstrate that the romantic is
in error: the agrarian community living in the midst of virgin nature
is a product of the romantic's own head. Not, however, in the sense
that a return to the past is impossible because of the irreversibility
of modernisation, but because that past has never existed.
The romantic,
in other words, idealises something that he supposes he has lost,
although it is precisely that idealisation that produces the 'lost'
object in the form he knows it. It is precisely the loss of Karelia
[a region that formed part of Finland before the Second World War]
that creates 'Karelia'.
But does the
romantic really want Karelia back? Does he not, rather, enjoy
the absence of what he interprets as lost? Holding an object as
lost is one way of holding on to the object. The romantic does not
have any cake, but for that very reason he can eat it.
In fact, if
the romantic were very clever, he would give up what he has in order
to be able to begin to miss it and idealise it! This would be perverse
romanticism.
For this reason, the romantic is a very different gure from the
nostalgic, who may genuinely wish to have some lost object back.
What then
does the nostalgic wish to have back from the past? The future
of the past. Man longs for the past, when he still had a future.
If some former left-winger yearns for the Seventies, it is because
the future was then still his.
We remember
the tragedy that took place in Sweden a couple of years ago: a Kurdish
father murdered his daughter because the 'honour of the community'
demanded it. Did it indeed? The act may have been a kind of magic,
the incarnation of the hope that the longed-for Genuine Kurdish
Community would be born through that deed. This was a case of perverse
nostalgia.
Melancholy,
on the other hand, is the anticipation of loss rather than the mourning
of loss. The melancholic person has something, but he mourns
its loss in anticipation. In this sense melancholy is nostalgia
adopted in advance with respect to the present: grieving of a future
time when there will no longer be a future to look forward to.
It is not, however, enough to remark that the romantic himself creates
the object of his romanticisation. For perhaps what is genuine is
not so much the genuine itself as the romanticisation concerning
the genuine. It has been said that the Egyptians themselves were
Egyptologists. I believe it to be possible that lumberjacks themselves
are lumberjack romantics. Similarly, children, too, are at their
most 'childish' when they are acting out the role of children –
either in order to fish for attention or just because it is 'what
they do'. And young people always know how to act the role of contemporary
youth suffering from the lack of facilities provided for them.
Or let us
consider the way in which Finns are Finns. Few are woodsmen or 'rednecks'
by nature. They are adopted and maintained figures. The sentence,
'I'm a woodsman and a redneck and I'm proud of it' actually means
that the speaker has chosen this identity. When an ice-hockey
fan dresses up as a redneck, this is an adopted role which
contains a kind of romanticising reference to the gure of a redneck.
And, who knows, it is only in this sense that the redneck exists.
Between Nokia and the pismire
It is said that Finland is the world's leading
information society. If so, the reason may be as follows: Finland
is the world's most European country. For it is located on the periphery,
and Europe is nothing but periphery: it is the lack of central power
that characterises Europe. Finland's culture is young and thin,
just as the culture of Europe is, in spite of everything, compared
to the ancient cultures. Finland is a country whose own identity
is the object of constant pondering and sometimes even desperate
searching – just as Europe is a continent characterised by
the question, 'What is Europe?' (Unlike Asia, which is not characterised
by the question, 'What is Asia?')
And, in sum, it is clear that there is nothing more European
than the country which is in the lead in terms of the level of its
standard of living, its education, its library network and its information
technology – Finland.
Finland is the world's most non-European country. In Paris,
even the punks apologise if they bump into you, but here lives a
people who just says 'oops', a nation that growls in buses, pees
in stairwells, laps up beer and vodka, and whose urbanism still
hangs by the finest of threads left behind it by 'city culture'.
Finland is inhabited by the most backward, forest-living geeks
of Europe, who existed silently in the wilderness when Iceland,
for example, had already had a literary culture for centuries. Yes
– Iceland!
Two clichés. Which of them is true?
Both, for clichés are always true. It is essential
to see the close connection between supposed Europeanness and supposed
backwoodsness.
Pre-literary archaism and international high technology fit
together well. When, about a century and a half ago, Finland was
invented, myths, modern literature and money were created in the
country at the same time. That is why Finland has only a
little space between nature and technology, only a modicum of well-rooted
national literary tradition and the modern culture that might arise
from it, whose breathing and basic rhythm might soften the arrival
of economic modernisation and other foreign influences. In Finland
everything passes through like a basketball through the basket.
There is no friction, resistance, counterforce, hindrance achieved
by the symbolic legacy, created by tradition or modern literary
culture. In Finland, there is nothing between Nokia and a pismire
– and that is why we have Nokia.
If everything that is stratified, archaeological, historical,
symbolic is foreign to Finland, this also means that the same applies
to all the dimensions of urbanity that do not derive from technology.
Culture is an area that lies between production and the national
way of life: a 'held over' area, or suspension, as a musician
would say. It is an area in which one can freely practice activities
that are not bound to production and one's immediate livelihood.
If today's 'shortened childhood', the ideology of management
by results and the aestheticisation of mass technology threaten
to limit the breathing space of culture, this is not a sign of antagonism
toward culture. It is, on the contrary, a question of a thirst for
culture: a desire to suck culture into production – to develop
ideas, create signs, codes, advertisements and designs, to build
theoretical models and visions, invent business philosophies, compose
lift music and design pleasant environments.
Design always makes a deep impression on us barbarians. Correspondingly,
design needs barbarians either as its enemies or as its noble savages.
Finland is like the city of Oulu in the north: a techno-village,
the proximity of Lapland, and an enormous cultural centre with active
figures too few in number. Finland is Espoo: a techno-village, the
proximity of the forest and an an enormous cultural centre with
active voluntary figures too few in number.
The lack of tradition can, however, as a side-effect, produce
broad-mindedness and fresh eclecticism. And articial cultural resources
offered from above can, as a side-effect, produce – resources.
Finland has cultural life because its people are educated
and its elite vernacular. In many traditional centres, life and
culture are more strictly sectored apart.
There is thus nothing schizophrenic about Finland's basically
bipartite nature. Finland is a clone of a Europe that does not exist.
Translated by Hildi Hawkins
Top of page
|